

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 20, 2014

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. L. Burnfield, Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending June 20, 2014

Staff members Davis and Sircar were on site to provide oversight. Staff members Eul, Owen, and Troan were on site to conduct a review of work planning and control at SRNS.

**Savannah River Remediation:** Stuart MacVean was named President and Project Manager of SRR.

**K-Area:** On Tuesday, K-Area management declared a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) violation for failure to complete a surveillance within the required time. The surveillance was for a six month visual inspection of the vault fire suppression system nozzles to ensure they are unobstructed and in working condition. The surveillance was completed with no issues immediately following identification of the problem. During the last revision of the safety basis in September 2012, a note was added to the TSR identifying that the grace period (normally 25%) did not apply to this particular surveillance. Subsequent review identified that three surveillances (four including the surveillance completed this week) were conducted in the grace period contrary to the approved TSR.

During the critique, safety basis personnel identified that the note was mistakenly included in the safety basis revision. The change was not flagged by revision bars and not included in the safety basis implementation plan due to loss of configuration management. As part of the corrective actions, SRNS is evaluating additional measures to improve configuration control of safety basis changes. Extent of condition reviews for similar issues are also being pursued at K-Area and other SRNS facilities.

**H-Canyon:** SRNS used a robotic crawler to inspect the process air exhaust tunnel, to allow an improved assessment of the tunnel's structural integrity. This crawler was designed to allow inspection of the portions of the roof and walls that could not be observed by the previous crawler in 2011 (see report dated 1/6/12). After SRNS successfully placed the crawler into the tunnel, they discovered that a tool for putting the crawler into the required configuration was not long enough; this delayed the start of the inspection. After this was addressed, the inspection proceeded well with the crawler negotiating several obstacles, until the crawler tipped onto its side. There is no easy method for returning the crawler to the upright position. The crawler had travelled about 320 feet, out of about 450 feet desired. SRNS is evaluating various options for how to proceed. Some exposed sections of rebar were observed, as was the case in the previous inspection.

Operators performed simulator runs of the second cycle process to maintain their proficiency. Runs using non-radiological materials in the Canyon were not possible with the Canyon in standby mode. A DOE Readiness Assessment will occur before first and second cycle operations are performed with radiological materials.

**Radiological Protection:** The site rep attended a functional program review of the SRNS radiological protection program. These reviews are presented to allow senior management the opportunity to explore the performance indicators that they receive on a regular basis. The review indicated that the radiological protection program is a stable program with some improvements being made since 2009 and more significant improvements being made since the current radiological protection director was appointed to that position.